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INTRODUCTION

Spontaneous order, as famously explored by Friedrich Hayek, is the
antithesis of top-down control; it emerges from a multiplicity of individual
responses to dispersed informational signals.1 Hayek’s work emphasizes the
role of market forces in providing those signals, and the role of law in
providing the background conditions under which a spontaneous marketbased order can arise and thrive.2 Private property fits cleanly into this model.
Yet there are many domains of great economic and social significance in
which private property rights have not (or have not yet) been established;
rather, resources are held in common. Examples range from shared roads
and parks, to fisheries and forests, to the ambience or bustle in a
neighborhood or business district. Establishing and sustaining spontaneous
order in these contexts means finding ways for individuals to coordinate their
dispersed actions in the absence of formal private property rights or top-down
coercion.3
This Essay focuses on the role of resource segmentation—the natural or
artificial division of resources into appropriable units—in eliciting and

1. See, e.g., 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35–54 (1973)
[hereinafter 1 HAYEK, RULES] (examining manifestations of spontaneous order in natural and
social systems); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 159–60 (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK,
CONSTITUTION] (citing MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 159 (1951)) (discussing
spontaneous order); see also F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945) [hereinafter Hayek, Knowledge] (emphasizing the importance of harnessing dispersed
knowledge).
2. See, e.g., 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE 162 (1979) (“[T]his extensive social division of labour [in modern society], based on
widely dispersed information, has been made possible entirely by the use of those impersonal
signals which emerge from the market process and tell people what to do in order to adapt their
activities to events of which they have no direct knowledge.”); Hayek, Knowledge, supra note 1, at
526–28 (describing the coordinating and information-transmission function of prices). In
Hayek’s view, “the task of the lawgiver is not to set up a particular order but merely to create
conditions in which an orderly arrangement can establish and ever renew itself.” HAYEK,
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 161; see also 1 HAYEK, RULES, supra note 1, at 47 (analogizing one
function of government to the maintenance of machinery that serves the purposes determined
by the aggregate decisions of producers and consumers).
3. Large literatures have examined the conditions that support such informal cooperation,
including the line of scholarship associated with Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking work on
common-pool resources. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). Other works have examined how social norms
support informal order. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). Urban infrastructure and information commons have increasingly
received attention. For a recent overview and discussion, see Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth:
The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013) (reviewing
BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)).
Another line of literature examines the emergence or evolution of property rights. See, e.g., ROBERT
SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (2d ed. 2004); Lee Alston &
Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of Property Rights, IOWA L. REV. 2255 (2015).
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maintaining coordination among resource users in the absence of formal
property rights. My claim is that the appropriate segmentation of resources
can reduce informal governance burdens and help to produce convergence
between privately optimal and socially optimal choices.4
To take a simple example, a pie that has been divided into single-serving
slices is easy for a group to share in a strife-free manner. Even if social norms
might cut against taking “too much” of an undivided shared resource (such
as a milkshake accessed with multiple straws, or a natural gas reserve lying
under land held separately by a number of neighbors), it can be difficult to
know how much is too much in the absence of visible, pre-divided shares. Selfserving bias takes on a rather literal meaning in such settings,5 and excessive
claims by multiple parties can generate losses through overly rapid or
contentious extraction.6 Segmentation is relevant not only where resources
are extracted from a common pool, but also where effort or other resources
must be contributed to a common project. Here too, success may depend on
how the solicited contributions are broken up.7
There are two basic reasons that resource segmentation matters to
spontaneous order: It can reduce informal governance burdens by facilitating
measurement, and it can produce convergence between privately and socially
valuable choices by constructing choice sets. Consider first how resource
segmentation supports governance. Segmentation, whether given by nature
(individual animals, trees, pieces of fruit) or artificially constructed
(boatloads, bushels, pie slices) provides a measuring rod for assessing draws
on, or contributions to, common pools. Measurement enables monitoring by
other participants that can facilitate the enforcement of social norms.8 It also
allows parties to monitor their own behavior and compare it with that of
others. This process of comparison can support internalized norms of fairness
and reassure actors that their own efforts or acts of forbearance are being
reciprocated by others.
4. I do not mean to suggest that resource segmentation is only useful in the context of
informal order; it is also foundational to formal order to the extent it eases enforcement burdens,
and it can feature in hybrid or evolving systems as well.
5. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337 (1995) (examining self-serving evaluations of fairness and their capacity to impede
settlement).
6. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S591–92 (2002) (describing the costs of
“extractive anarchy” in the oil and gas context); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Essay, Tragically
Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2000) (noting similar
issues with groundwater extraction).
7. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Essay, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 336 (2004) (noting the significance
of divisible, granular segments of effort in sustaining models of peer production that rely on
widespread volunteerism).
8. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 3, at 45, 94–100 (discussing the significance of monitoring).
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Resource segmentation also helps produce convergence between
privately and socially optimal choices. This result follows from two
underappreciated concepts: irrelevant externalities and lumpiness.9 A simple
example illustrates the intuition. People who attend festivals create positive
spillovers for others in attendance.10 These positive spillovers create no
inefficiencies if the person is motivated to attend the festival for her own
reasons and would not do anything differently if she were able to collect
payments from those who benefit from her presence. This last proviso—that
she would not do anything differently—is more likely to be fulfilled if
“attending the festival” is a discrete, binary action that must be performed in
its entirety or not at all. When contributions or withdrawals from a common
pool take such “lumpy” or discontinuous forms, the private and social
optimum may more readily converge on a single choice, despite the presence
of externalities.11
Because resource segmentation influences the prospects for cooperative
behavior, it should be an explicit focus of law and policy. Law can, for
example, take a direct role as a resource slicer or aggregator. Policy can also
edge chunky private decisions in the direction of social optimality through
investments in infrastructure and the like. These legal and policy efforts can
improve conditions for informal self-ordering around resources. They can
also help foster the emergence of formal property rights, or facilitate the use
of market-mimicking regulation rather than command-and-control coercion.
In short, segmentation can support spontaneous order.
The analysis here proceeds in three steps. Part II examines the
significance of resource segmentation for governance in the absence of
formal private property rights. Part III shows how resource segmentation, by
constructing choice sets, influences efficiency. Part IV connects these two
ideas and considers the implications for law and policy.
II. SEGMENTATION AND GOVERNANCE
The ways in which resources are sliced up, either naturally or by design,
influence the prospects for informal order and coordination in the absence
of formal entitlements. I start with an overview of the forms resource
segmentation can take and then explain how governance costs might be
affected by segmentation—for better or worse.

9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 769 (1986) (describing a festival as “exponentially enhanced by
greater participation”). It is true, of course, that festivals can at times become unpleasantly
crowded. The example here assumes that participation levels are in a range where more
participation adds rather than subtracts value.
11. See infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
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A. RESOURCE SEGMENTATION: AN OVERVIEW
Resource segmentation, as used in this Essay, refers to the natural or
artificial division of natural resources, goods, or services into units that can be
appropriated from, or contributed to, a resource system. Segmentation
sometimes appears naturally but often is artificially constructed. For example,
land does not naturally occur in discrete segments, but it can be surveyed and
demarcated into parcels for claiming. Similarly, where there is no well-defined
resource unit, standardized or shared harvesting equipment (serving spoons,
fishing nets, and so on) can produce one. Where it is not possible to break off
well-defined physical quantities, an appropriation method may nonetheless
place a practical limit on the amount of a resource that can be appropriated
over a particular timespan. This creates a kind of temporal segmentation that
may be measured in seasons, days, or hours.12
It is helpful to consider how resource segmentation connects to Elinor
Ostrom’s distinction between a “resource system” and “resource units”—that
is, between “stock” and “flow.”13 Common-pool resources, in Ostrom’s
schema, represent resource systems or stocks that produce flows of resource
units that individual actors can appropriate.14 In the standard pasture fable,15
the resource system (stock) is the grazing pasture as a whole and the resource
units (flow) are the blades of grass that support the grazing cattle. Resource
systems also require inputs, such as seeds and labor in the pasture context.
Thus, commoners feed rival, privately owned inputs into the common-pool
resource system and withdraw rival outputs from that same system, reducing
them to private ownership.16 Resource segmentation relates both to the draws
private actors make upon the resource system and to the contributions that
they make to it.
With respect to draws from the system, it is intuitive to focus on the
resource units themselves, such as individual fish or trees. But access to
resource systems may also be segmented in a variety of ways, generating claims
over a subset of the flow that will be produced. For example, commoners may

12. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 228 (2005).
13. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 30–33 (emphasis omitted) (making this distinction and
developing its implications).
14. Id. at 30.
15. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
16. It is this abutment between individually and commonly owned elements that pulls
incentives out of alignment in ways that may (but need not necessarily) lead to tragedy. See Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–23 (1973);
Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 37–38 & n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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be limited to particular harvesting methods or technologies17—what Carol
Rose calls “RIGHTWAY”18—or there may simply be standard equipment that
is used by convention. Cattle grazing on a pasture provides an interesting
example. The actual resource units in question (blades of grass) are too small,
numerous, and difficult to observe to serve the purposes of segmentation. The
cattle themselves, by contrast, represent a highly visible form of “harvesting
equipment” with a (roughly) known capacity.19 Access to the resource system
is thereby segmented de facto based on the number of cattle placed on the
pasture. Fishing nets and boats can operate similarly, at least if they have
relatively standardized capacities.20 Rotations based on time represent
another way of slicing up access to the resource system.21
Segmentation is as important for contributions to a resource system
(time, effort, money, and so on) as it is for draws upon a resource system.
Indeed, we can recast contributions as forgone draws and vice versa. One of
the most significant ways in which one contributes to a resource system is by
not overdrawing it—keeping cattle off the pasture and the grass on the
ground, or keeping fishing boats out of the water and the fish in the sea.22
Conversely, by not contributing labor, money, or other inputs to maintain and
improve a resource system, one is effectively withdrawing (or withholding)

17. See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 (1989) (describing
the regulation of shrimp harvesting in Texas, which includes a restriction that “[d]uring the fall
adult white shrimp season, only one net twenty-five feet in width can be pulled by any vessel”).
18. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (building on an enumeration of strategies provided in Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64
(1970)).
19. See, e.g., Ivo Baur et al., Why Do Individuals Behave Differently in Commons Dilemmas? The Case
of Alpine Farmers Using Common Property Pastures in Grindelwald, Switzerland, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 657,
659–62 (2014) (observing that “livestock provides the means to harvest from common property
pastures,” and describing a system used in Switzerland that measures a pasture’s “maximum
sustainable yield” in terms of summered “livestock units” based on animal species and age).
20. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 3, at 174 (“The cost of monitoring an apportioning scheme
based on an easily observable factor—what technology a boat is using—is much lower than the
cost for one based on the quantity of fish harvested.”). New technologies capable of generating
higher yields can, therefore, disrupt existing commons arrangements. See TERRY L. ANDERSON &
PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST 27 (2004) (“Though technological change usually
lowers the cost of establishing property rights, it can also make the institutional entrepreneur’s
task harder if it increases access to resources.”).
21. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 12, at 228–33 & tbl.8.2 (providing a catalog of “choice
rules” for allocating common-pool resources, including allocations based on location, time slot,
quantity, and resource attributes).
22. See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra note 3, at 137 (describing a fishing ground vulnerable to overfishing
as “a public good whose quality is maintained by the restraint of individual fishermen”).
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from the system that which is rival and amenable to private ownership—no
less so than when resource units are appropriated.23
B. BETTER SEGMENTS, CHEAPER GOVERNANCE
To remain sustainable, a resource system must keep aggregate
contributions above, and aggregate draws below, certain critical thresholds.
In the absence of prices to modulate the relevant demand or supply, some
other coordinating mechanism must be used. This is where resource
segmentation comes in. Norms of not taking too much or contributing too
little are easier to follow, monitor, and enforce where activities or resources
are broken into units that readily define how much is too much or too little.24
But units that are too large, too small, or too hard to observe will not serve
these beneficial purposes.25 Improving segmentation, then, can improve the
prospects for governance systems that rely on individual decisionmaking—
spontaneous order rather than centralized control.
Most notably, segmentation influences how easily actors can meter their
own resource appropriations and monitor those of others. The significance
of monitoring to the successful management of common-pool resources has
been well noted.26 The way resources are broken up bears on monitoring by
affecting the visibility of actors’ draws and contributions.27 Self-monitoring
may be as important as the monitoring of others in some contexts.28 For

23. There may of course be normative reasons to favor one characterization or the other;
the point is simply that both characterizations are possible. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1196–97 (1967) (noting the malleability of the line between causing harm and failing to
provide benefits).
24. David Lewis gives an example in which ten friends routinely share a plate of 20 shrimp,
with each person willing to limit herself to two shrimp as long as the others do the same. DAVID
LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 96 (1969). While Lewis does not focus on the
discrete nature of the food units and their ready divisibility by the number of sharers, these factors
would clearly make the sharing equilibrium easier to maintain over the alternative “state of
nature” outcome. See id.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. Elinor Ostrom identifies “monitoring” as one of the eight “[d]esign principles
illustrated by long-enduring [common-pool resource] institutions.” OSTROM, supra note 3, at 90
tbl.3.1; see also id. at 94–100 (discussing monitoring and sanctions); Kipling Williams et al.,
Identifiability as a Deterrent to Social Loafing: Two Cheering Experiments, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 303, 307 (1981) (finding, in an experiment involving group cheering efforts, that making
people believe their contributions were identifiable deterred “social loafing”).
27. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 203–05 (noting the relevance of “physical attributes of the
resource itself” to ease of monitoring, and describing some factors that can increase or decrease
the visibility of appropriation actions, such as whether “appropriators all return to the same
location at the end of their activities, so that the quantity of resource units each has acquired is
open for casual inspection”).
28. The significance of opportunities for self-evaluation in group settings has been studied
experimentally. See, e.g., Stephen G. Harkins & Kate Szymanski, Social Loafing and Self-Evaluation
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example, studies on the importance of feedback regarding energy use have
demonstrated how making people aware of their usage, and of how it
compares to that of others, can influence their behavior.29 Similarly, research
suggests that larger portion sizes tend to increase consumption, as does an
inability to keep track of the amount one has consumed.30 Segmentation thus
serves as a kind of “nudge” that can alter resource use.31
The measurement facilitated by segmentation also helps to keep rough
accounts, which can sustain reciprocity among members of a relevant
community.32 One of the advantages of informal resource sharing is that it
requires less specification of rights and duties—what Yochai Benkler terms
“crispness.”33 Nonetheless, repeat play in a reasonably well-defined context
will be facilitated by a shared understanding of the relevant unit of
appropriation or exchange. An example, or perhaps metaphor, is the “give-apenny-take-a-penny” saucer that appears by many cash registers; by making
the unit explicit, the proprietor conveys that the saucer is not to be emptied
into one’s pocket nor filled with the contents of one’s coin jar.
Segmentation plays a central role in formal rationing systems. For
example, hunting and fishing limits may be stated in terms of numbers of
animals, or controlled by specifying seasons and methods.34 Limits on
portability, storage, or alienability similarly partition resources based on
with an Objective Standard, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 354, 361 (1988) (finding, in an
experimental study, that facilitating self-evaluation against an objective standard was sufficient to
encourage contributions to group efforts).
29. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison
Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 992 (2013). Some recent work
in this area has focused on dimensions of particular relevance to shared energy usage settings.
See, e.g., Tom Hargreaves et al., Keeping Energy Visible? Exploring How Householders Interact with
Feedback from Smart Energy Monitors in the Longer Term, 52 ENERGY POL’Y 126, 129–32 (2013)
(examining longer-term effects of energy-monitoring devices on the intra-household dynamics
surrounding energy use); Caroline Leygue et al., Energy Sharing and Energy Feedback: Affective and
Behavioral Reactions to Communal Energy Displays, FRONTIERS ENERGY RES., July 2014, at 1
(exploring how information about individual usage within shared energy settings generates
emotional responses like guilt, anger, and fear).
30. See generally BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK (2007).
31. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). Approaches that encourage self-awareness or
facilitate self-monitoring may be viewed as a more autonomy-preserving form of intervention than
other manifestations of “libertarian paternalism.” See Gregory Mitchell, Review Essay, Libertarian
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1257–58 & n.46 (2005) (making this point
and citing studies on the effects of (literal) mirrors on behavior).
32. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 55–56 (discussing the “rough mental account” that a person
in a close-knit community can keep with respect to her interactions with other community members);
id. at 225–29 (describing the “Even-Up” strategy for cooperation and punishment of defection).
33. Benkler, supra note 7, at 315–17.
34. Such rationing methods can also form the basis for more formal property rights. See,
e.g., ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 209–10 (discussing “individual transferable quotas” used
in ocean fisheries).

A6_FENNELL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/28/2015 7:16 PM

SLICING SPONTANEITY

2373

parties’ personal capacities to use or consume.35 But segmentation can check
resource use even in the absence of formal rationing. For instance, a buffet’s
practice of providing smaller plates and cups not only slows consumption
(some time and effort is required to reload or refill) but also communicates
norms about what is an appropriate amount to consume.36 Likewise, the lines
demarcating parking spaces serve as focal points37 that generally induce
compliance by motorists, even in free lots where the risk of enforcement is
minimal. Appropriate segmentation can also prevent underuse by making clear
what one can legitimately claim without encroaching on the interests of
others. For example, people may sit closer together on public benches that
are divided by armrests than on undivided benches.38
Pre-segmented contributions can also reduce the burdens of enforcing
norms about giving and reassure donors that they are contributing the “right”
amount. For example, someone taking up a collection for a gift might indicate
a round amount that everyone should contribute to make the planned gift
possible. Charitable organizations, which must solve much larger-scale
collective action problems, also commonly include suggested or
recommended contribution amounts rather than issuing open-ended pleas
for funds. Often the requested donation is conceptually concretized and
quantified by reference to a discrete and tangible unit of assistance, such as a
goat or a box of nails.39 Where truly indivisible goods are involved, it may be
enough to specify what the charity views as an acceptable and helpful
donation level. For example, campaigns by zoos to acquire elephants—true

35. All-you-can-eat buffets are an intuitive example in which consumption capacity segments
resource units, with portability prohibitions effectively constraining the time dimension. See
Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 979–82 (1985) (discussing
the role of alienability limits in a system of riparian rights); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting
Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1430–33 (2009) (examining how limits on alienability, use,
and storage can serve as rationing devices).
36. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 44; WANSINK, supra note 30, at 60–61, 244.
37. For a discussion of how focal points can solve coordination problems, see, for example,
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658–63 (2000)
(citing and discussing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960)).
38. See, e.g., BILL MAIN & GAIL GREET HANNAH, SITE FURNISHINGS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THE PLANNING, SELECTION, AND USE OF LANDSCAPE FURNITURE AND AMENITIES 98 (2009)
(observing that armrests “can increase seating density, as people typically will sit closer together
if their personal space is delimited by an armrest”). Of course, armrests may instead (or
additionally) be motivated by concerns about overappropriation (or by a desire to filter users),
given that they also keep people from lying down. See id.
39. See, e.g., Help Build Houses and Hope, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, https://www.habitat.org/
cd/giving/one/donate.aspx?link=1 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (providing a “quick gift guide”
that includes contributions ranging from “a box of nails” for $10 to “flooring” for $2000);
Unwrapped, OXFAM AM., https://www.oxfamamericaunwrapped.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015)
(specifying the monetary donations that would fund certain items, such as a goat, a duck, soap, a
vegetable garden, a medical kit, and school supplies).
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lumpy goods—have solicited pennies from schoolchildren.40 The March of
Dimes campaign, started in 1938, was similarly able to elicit broad
participation for an indivisible cause (fighting polio) by focusing on a
contribution level that was broadly attainable.41 Research also suggests the
efficacy of establishing contribution tiers or categories in encouraging people
to “round up” their contributions to achieve the next level.42
In-kind contributions also depend on proper segmentation. Blood
donation, for example, features a standard donative increment—one pint.43
In other contexts, segment construction becomes important. As Benkler
observes, “peer production [labor] can be harnessed when a project is broken
up into discrete modules, whose granularity is varied and sufficiently fine
grained to allow individuals with diverse motivations to engage in the effort at
levels appropriate for their motivations but still provide stable contributions
to the whole.”44 Innumerable collective projects, from quilting bees to barn
raisings, depend on the ability to disaggregate and assign appropriately
segmented tasks to be completed before and during the interactive event.
Making effective use of volunteers requires a similar slicing of time
commitments into discrete and manageable segments.45
C. WHEN SEGMENTATION FAILS
If successful segmentation can lower governance costs and support
spontaneous order, poor segmentation can make coordination more costly

40. For example, Judy the Elephant was purchased by the Oklahoma City Zoo in 1949
through donations of pennies, nickels, and dimes from 50,000 schoolchildren. See Judy Kuhlman,
Children Reach in Pockets for Oklahoma City Zoo Judy the Elephant Popular Campaign, NEWSOK, Apr.
24, 1994, available at http://newsok.com/children-reach-in-pockets-for-oklahoma-city-zoo-judythe-elephant-popular-campaign/article/2463998. Other animals have been acquired for other
zoos through similar campaigns. Id.
41. The phrase “March of Dimes,” which played off the name of the popular newsreel “The
March of Time,” was coined by entertainer Eddie Cantor, a supporter of what was then known as
the National Institute for Infantile Paralysis. See Eddie Cantor and the Origin of the March of Dimes,
MARCH OF DIMES, http://www.marchofdimes.org/mission/eddie-cantor-and-the-origin-of-themarch-of-dimes.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). Cantor’s radio appeal in January 1938 yielded
$268,000 in dimes (mailed to President Roosevelt) within a few days.
42. James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse
into Fund-Raising, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1605, 1606, 1618–20 & fig.3 (2004) (discussing this intuition
and presenting experimental results suggesting that reporting contributions in categories can
“shift contributions to a higher level”).
43. See, e.g., Donation FAQs, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/donating-blood/
donation-faqs (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); see also SUGDEN, supra note 3, at 4 (giving the example of
Britain’s National Blood Transfusion Service as a public good supported by voluntary donations).
44. Benkler, supra note 7, at 336.
45. For example, the “One Brick” volunteer program that exists in several cities touts
“commitment-free volunteering” in which participants attend discrete volunteering events on an
a la carte basis. See Volunteering with One Brick Is as Easy as 1, 2, 3, ONE BRICK: CHI., http://chicago.
onebrick.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
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and unlikely. One way that segmentation can fail is when the demarcation of
appropriable units is unclear. This phenomenon can be seen even in the
context of private land holdings, where irregular shapes yield more boundary
disputes.46 But the point holds true for other interests as well. For example,
surface boundaries that sufficed for mining placer claims were insufficient for
subsurface quartz claims because it might become difficult to tell whether the
same or different vein was being tapped.47 Likewise, ozone depletion is hard
to manage because it involves “small (effectively invisible), highly mobile
substances that are distributed throughout the earth’s atmosphere.”48
Segmentation problems can also arise when the appropriable units are
very clear. Consider the example of college classrooms that are kept open
during nights and weekends to be used as study rooms. A study of a number
of college facilities undertaken decades ago found that “[t]he standard
custom seems to award the whole room to the first student to take possession
by squatter’s rights.”49 Here, too-large units induce people to appropriate too
much.50 But segmentation that leads people to take or accept less than is really
useful presents a problem as well. For example, Terry Anderson and Peter
Hill have suggested that the Homestead Acts “specif[ied] a claim size that was
generally inappropriate given the aridity of land on the frontier.”51 Similar
issues exist on the contribution side as well—asking too much or too little can
backfire.52

46. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating
Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426, 450–53 (2011).
47. See ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 116-17 (citing Gary D. Libecap, Economic
Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 338,
345–46 (1978)).
48. Graham Epstein et al., Governing the Invisible Commons: Ozone Regulation and the Montreal
Protocol, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 337, 347 (2014).
49. STUART M. STOKE ET AL., STUDENT REACTIONS TO STUDY FACILITIES: WITH IMPLICATIONS
FOR ARCHITECTS AND COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS 15 (1960); id. at 9–10 (describing “[l]ibrary
seminar rooms” that are effectively turned into “large private offices” (albeit ones whose
occupancy turns over frequently) because “the first student to study in one usually attempts to
discourage others from sharing it”); see also ROBERT SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE: THE BEHAVIORAL
BASIS OF DESIGN 56 (1969) (discussing STOKE ET AL., supra).
50. Stoke and his coauthors express pessimism about being able to turn these classrooms
into successful study quarters, but do note that experimentation “e.g. using folding partitions”
might be tried. STOKE ET AL., supra note 49, at 15.
51. ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 170. The Homestead Acts variously granted
allotments of 160 acres, 320 acres, and 640 acres to those who met certain requirements,
including living on and working the land for five years. See id. at 168–69.
52. See, e.g., Andreoni & Petrie, supra note 42, at 1619 (suggesting that reporting charitable
contributions by categories or tiers “can be a powerful mechanism to affect contribution
decisions” but observing that “[p]oorly chosen categories may reduce contributions or may have
no effect on shifting contributions at all”).
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Thus, segmentation can fail if it does not take a sufficiently visible form,
or if it does not align well with the efficient scale of appropriation or use.53 It
may also fail if it does not produce relatively homogeneous appropriable or
contributable units. Homogeneity need not be absolute; there can be, for
example, multiple tiers of contribution, and people may appropriate different
numbers of units based on their consumption needs. But some degree of
standardization is required for segmentation to serve the metering and
monitoring functions that reduce governance costs.54
***
The possibility that better segmentation can reduce governance burdens
provides a good reason for law and policy to pay attention to it. At some level,
of course, the idea of resource segmentation merely stands in for a set of
recognized factors that bear on the success of resource arrangements: the
clarity of entitlements,55 the ease of monitoring and metering,56 the existence
of prominent relationships and focal points,57 the use of marking and
communication,58 and alignment with notions of reciprocity and fairness.59
But even if these other concepts collectively convey how and why resource
segmentation lowers governance burdens, segmentation’s congruence with

53. It is possible that the efficient scale for use would differ from the efficient scale for (at
least some types of) appropriation. The amount of land that can be successfully claimed and held
through a first-in-time system like that used in the Oklahoma Land Runs might, for example,
differ from the amount that is necessary for successful farming. For a discussion of some of the
effects of costly racing during the 1893 Oklahoma Land Rush, see ANDERSON & HILL, supra note
20, at 172–74. The possibility of a difference between optimal segmentation for appropriation
and optimal segmentation for use speaks to the fact that the target resource (such as land) is
never the only resource in the picture. Instead, there is always a linked “resource-appropriation
environment” that forms a commons of its own. See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 922–24 (2004).
54. Such standardization does sacrifice some of the advantages of customization. But it may
allow informal self-governance to succeed in place of top-down solutions that might be imposed
by those who are less likely to possess good information about the needs of each claimant or
contributor. I thank Richard Epstein for discussions on this point.
55. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81–82 (1985).
56. See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra note 3, at 49–54, 98–107; McAdams, supra note 37, at 1658–63.
Of particular relevance to resource segmentation is the capacity of landmarks, whether natural
or constructed, to provide focal points. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF
LAW 86–90 (2015); Richard Brooks, Legal Landmarks (Nov. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author); see also JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 100 (1992) (“The
key in [coordination problem] situations is to discover something in the environment that will
catch the attention of enough actors so that they can establish a common action, a standard of
behavior that will eventually be emulated by the other members of the community.”).
58. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55, at 81–88.
59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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these ideas suggests it is worth paying attention to as a powerful and policymalleable proxy.
An analogy to exclusion’s role in property rights might be drawn here.
Scholars recognize that exclusion is merely a means to an end—that of
enabling people to make use of resources.60 Exclusion proxies for an
alignment between inputs and outcomes that could be achieved through
other means, at least in theory, and it is that alignment that is really doing the
work. But exclusion captures our attention as an interesting and policyrelevant feature of property rights. Segmentation should as well.
III. CONSTRUCTING CHOICE SETS
The ability of resource segmentation to lower governance burdens is only
one facet of its importance for spontaneous order. Segmentation also
constructs the choice sets that appropriators and contributors face—the
menu of possible stopping points. The lumpiness of these choices can cause
private and social payoffs to converge on the same decision point, even when
externalities are present. On the other hand, sometimes lumpy choices will
force an even greater divergence between optimal behavior and individual
choices than would occur if all available decision points were open.
Understanding how choice sets can create such convergence or divergence is
important to the study of property rights because it helps explain why
externalities (including those that commoners inflict or bestow on each
other) may not spell the demise of a resource system.
A. LUMPING IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES
We can start with thumbnail sketches of two understudied concepts that
drive the analysis here: lumpiness and irrelevant externalities. Lumpiness in a
good, service, resource, or decision refers to the inability to produce or make
use of just any old amount; rather, the thing must be produced or consumed
(or sometimes both) in particular units.61 A bridge is the ultimate lumpy
good; if it is incomplete, it is of no use at all.62 In many other cases, there are
particular units or tiers that define feasible production and consumption
levels. Here, the choice menu of a party who is deciding how much to
contribute or withdraw does not comprise a continuous spectrum, but rather
a limited set of discrete nodes along it.

60. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (“[E]xclusion is the
practical means by which that [use] interest is protected.”); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1747 (2007) (“The right to
exclude from a designated thing protects our interests in the use of things like cars or Blackacre;
if no use could be made of a given thing, there would be no reason to exclude.”).
61. See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative
Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982).
62. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (noting and qualifying this point).
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Irrelevant externalities are external effects that do not cause an actor to
behave differently than she would if she fully took those effects into account.63
People frequently undertake acts that incidentally benefit others, even when
they have no way of demanding payment from the beneficiaries. Sometimes
this is due to altruism, cooperative norms, or more formal governance
mechanisms, but in many cases the explanation is simpler: The actor would
do the same thing even if she fully internalized all the costs and benefits.
Consider, for example, a rose garden cultivator who makes her garden as
beautiful for her own purposes as she would if she could collect viewing fees
from her neighbors.64 Likewise, people may efficiently engage in activities that
harm others (like emitting pollutants) if they would still make the same choice
after taking into account the effects on others.65
The two ideas come together in the spontaneous order context in the
following way: The lumpiness of choices can make it more likely that the
choice one selects for one’s own reasons will turn out to be the exact same
choice that is socially best.66 Where transaction costs preclude bargains to fully
internalize externalities, resource segmentation may be able to do some of
the work in encouraging socially valuable decisions. In other cases, however,
lumpiness can push private choices further away from the social optimum.
The following Subparts explain.
B. FORTUITOUS LUMPS
Let us start with the optimistic account in which lumpy choices produce
convergence between privately and socially optimal decisions. Suppose an
actor must decide whether to make a given chunky investment that will have

63. James Buchanan and Craig Stubblebine define a “Pareto-relevant externality” as one
that exhibits the potential for “gains from trade.” James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine,
Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371, 374–77 (1962). Such potential gains exist only where the party
affected by the externality would be willing to pay the actor producing it enough to alter her
behavior—that is, where internalization would make a difference. See id. at 380 (making this point
in the context of one party’s choice to build a fence that will affect another party). Externalities
are not Pareto-relevant if there is no such potential for gains from trade; because the affected
party could not pay the actor enough to change her behavior, internalizing the external cost
would make no difference. See id. at 374–77. I will refer to these simply as “irrelevant externalities”
here to signify their irrelevance to efficiency. Such externalities may, however, remain relevant to
distribution. Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 49 (8th ed. 2014) (observing that if an actor
does not change her behavior after taking an external effect into account, the effect is no longer
an “externality” but may still be distributively unfair).
64. See generally David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007).
65. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 49.
66. This core intuition is explored in a slightly different context in Mark P. Gergen, The Use
of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1013–19 (1992). Gergen gives the example of
a real estate broker who, despite reaping only a fraction of the benefits from a home’s sale, will
nonetheless undertake the efficient lumpy choice of putting a property on a multiple listing
service as long as she internalizes a sufficient return from taking this step. Id. at 1014–15 & n.55.
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positive spillovers on others, such as attending a particular event, buying a
home on a particular block, or opening a store on a particular corner. If this
investment is a binary choice—attend the event or not, say—then the actor
need only internalize enough benefits to make her participation privately
worthwhile in order to go ahead with the entire spillover-producing
investment. If, on the other hand, her investments were infinitely divisible,
then we might expect underinvestment, given that she does not get all the
returns herself.67
A failure to appreciate the lumpiness of the choices that often confront
agents has led to an overestimation of how often externalities matter to
efficiency. Standard graphical depictions of externalities contribute to this
misconception by portraying choice sets as continuous, so that any externality,
positive or negative, will cause the privately selected stopping point for a given
resource draw or contribution to diverge from the socially optimal stopping
point.68
Figure 1 illustrates this point in the context of negative externalities.
Figure 1. Externalities with Continuous Choice

67. Two important caveats to this assumption have been noted in the literature. First, if the
actor has preferences that are more intense than those of the others who will enjoy spillovers, she
may readily provide the good in question at a level that meets or surpasses the demand of all
others. See Haddock, supra note 64. Second, it is immaterial that an individual cannot recapture
all of her own returns if she is in a setting where she is capturing comparably valuable positive
spillovers from others as a direct result of her own spillover-causing activity. See Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 269 (2007). This might be
the case where engaging in activities that cause spillovers, like research and development, are a
necessary predicate to benefiting from the research and development of others. See id.
68. Likewise, formal models standardly assume continuity.
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The horizontal axis represents draws that an individual might make
against a common resource, as through pollution or harvesting, while the
vertical axis shows the impact in dollars. We would expect a rational actor to
stop making draws at QP, the point where her marginal private cost and
marginal private benefit lines cross; this is her private stopping point. The
dotted social cost line reflects the higher marginal social cost of the draws,
counting the impacts on others. The social stopping point, QS, shows where
the actor should stop making draws if these costs were taken into account.69
Here, the negative externalities make the actor stop too late in making draws.
A similar graph could be shown in which positive externalities make the actor
stop too soon in making contributions that benefit others.
Lumpiness changes the story by limiting the menu of possible stopping
points, as shown in Figure 2.70
Figure 2. Externalities with Lumpy Choices

It is now no longer possible for the actor to choose any point along the
horizontal axis as a stopping point; instead, there are only three possible
stopping points, as indicated by the vertical lines labeled 1, 2, and 3. Imagine,
for example, that these stopping points signify standard-sized boatloads of fish
or factory production runs that generate standard amounts of pollution, and
that it is not possible to stop harvesting or production at intermediate points.

69. This graph assumes there are no positive externalities produced by the draws, so the
marginal private benefit is also the marginal social benefit.
70. For a different way of illustrating the effects of lumpiness on choices that involve
externalities, see Gergen, supra note 66, at 1014 diagram 1.
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The private actor cannot, therefore, stop at QP, the “private stopping point”
identified earlier; she must choose between stopping a little sooner, at line 2,
or stopping a lot later, at line 3. Given those options, she will choose the
former. This is easy to see by comparing what she would lose relative to her
ideal point if she went all the way to line 3 (the rightmost large dark gray
triangle) with what she loses relative to her ideal point by settling for line 2
(the rightmost small light gray triangle).
This is also the socially optimal choice. Her neighbors or fellow
commoners might be happier if she scaled all the way back to line 1, but they
could not pay her enough to do so; moving to line 1 produces a net social loss
relative to settling for line 2. This is evident by comparing the social cost
relative to society’s ideal stopping point if she went all the way back to line 1
(the leftmost large dark gray triangle) with the social cost relative to society’s
ideal stopping point for settling for line 2 (the leftmost small light gray
triangle). Thus, in this example, the lumpiness of the choice set fortuitously
causes our actor to behave a bit better (stop a bit sooner) than she would if
her choices were unconstrained.71 Of course, there are other possible
scenarios in which chunkiness proves less desirable, as the next Subpart
explains.
C. LUMPS AS CLIFFS
Where resource segmentation produces lumpy choices about
appropriation or provision, actors are deprived of the ability to select their
ideal stopping points. The discussion above showed that sometimes this will
push an actor in the direction of a more socially beneficial stopping point.
But the opposite may also be true. An example in a context where
spontaneous order is especially important—urban agglomeration—shows
both sides of this point.
Suppose an exciting technology store (call it Dapple) with a busy
downtown location must decide whether to open a second store in an uptown
location. Because there is a minimum efficient scale for the new store, and no
advantage to going beyond that scale, the choice is a binary one—open the
store, or not. If the private returns from the store justify the choice, then it
matters not at all that the Dapple placement will also create positive spillovers
for commercial and residential properties nearby; Dapple will open the new
store. If we further assume that opening a third store is neither privately
profitable nor socially beneficial, then Dapple’s private choice about the
number of stores will happen to converge with the socially optimal choice.
This need not always be the case: It is entirely possible that taking all social
71. The statement in the text assumes that transaction costs would keep the parties from
arriving at the socially optimal position if choices were unconstrained. If transaction costs were
zero, then chunkiness would not provide the indicated advantage because the parties would reach
the socially preferred position in any case. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 8 (1960).
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benefits into account would call for more store openings than private selfinterest produces. But the chunkier the choices are relative to the divergence
between private and social payoffs, the more likely it is that the private and
social prescription will “land” on the same choice.
At the same time, the lumpiness of the choice raises the stakes and
increases the amount of inefficiency produced where the failure to internalize
externalities does make a difference. Thus, if the private returns to a second
Dapple store fall just a hair short of justifying the investment, an entire socially
efficient store is lost. Suppose instead that Dapple faces a continuous choice
about how large to make a single store. Here, it is more likely that positive or
negative externalities associated with a larger or smaller footprint will be
relevant to efficiency, since the menu of size choices is continuous and
unlimited. But at the same time, the consequences are not as severe; rather
than society losing an entire store as in the earlier example, all that is lost is
some marginal square footage.
As this example suggests, land use policies—such as the ease with which
an existing store can be expanded relative to the ease with which a new store
can be opened—can influence the shape of the choices that actors make, and
hence whether an urban actor is in a position to contribute to urban
agglomerations in big or small steps. The difference can affect the
sustainability of public goods and common-pool resources by altering the
degree to which private choices align with the social optimum.
IV. INTERSECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The discussion above has identified two channels through which
resource segmentation—the splitting up of contributable or appropriable
units—might influence the prospects for sustainable order in the absence of
formal entitlements. First, segmentation provides a metric that can facilitate
informal governance. Second, segmentation constructs choice sets, which can
affect how well private maximizing behavior aligns with the social optimum.
Subpart A briefly examines how these two channels of influence interact.
Subpart B considers how law and social policy might be made more sensitive
to segmentation considerations. Subpart C examines how public investments
and other policy choices can improve the odds that parties will be willing to
make lumpy, socially valuable choices.
A. SEGMENTATION, CHOICE ALIGNMENT, AND GOVERNANCE
The significance of resource segmentation for purposes of choice
alignment intersects with its significance for governance. Understanding
these interactions becomes especially important once we recognize the
capacity of law, policy, and even technology to influence how resources are
segmented. Consider again the limited menu of stopping points depicted in
Figure 2 above. This lumpiness in available choices might be due to a
technological constraint, or it might be socially or legally constructed. For
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example, suppose that the draws against the commons involve fencebuilding—an act that benefits the fence-builder but cuts off the scenic views
of neighboring properties.72 Further, suppose that as a result of law, norms,
or technology, fences must be constructed of prefabricated boards that come
in standard sizes, effectively limiting the height of the fence to just three
options: short (line 1), medium (line 2), and tall (line 3). For the reasons
discussed above, the actor will choose the medium fence, which is also the
socially preferred alternative on this limited menu.73
Suppose, however, that legal or technological changes permit
intermediate choices, including ones that perfectly align with society’s
preferred stopping point, QS, and with the fence-builder’s privately preferred
stopping point, QP. There is now the possibility of reaching a Pareto-superior
alternative through a bargain that would constrain the fence to the socially
optimal level.74 Of course, transaction costs may keep that result from being
realized.75 Meanwhile, the fence-builder is now free to diverge further from
the socially optimal result than she could under the constrained choice set,
by moving to her privately preferred stopping point.76
Whether the expanded menu produced by finer-grained segmentation
makes things better or worse depends on how these effects interact. But it also
depends in part on other impacts that the segmentation choice may have on
the prospects for informal governance and cooperation.77 Recall again the
role of segmentation in facilitating metering and monitoring—including selfmonitoring.78 If actors only have access to fairly large-grained, standardized
72. For a stylized fence-building example involving continuous height choices (but a
nonlinear height preference for the non-builder), see Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63,
at 377–80.
73. Supra Part III.B.
74. See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at 380. For this reason, we cannot rest easy
simply because the current menu of choices produces convergence between an actor’s privately
optimal choice and the one that is socially optimal; that convergence may be an artifact of a
constraint in the system that keeps us from a Pareto-superior solution. See CLEM TISDELL,
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 31 (1993) (“[I]f in the economy, externalities are infra-marginal
or in other ways apparently Pareto irrelevant or even if they are absent altogether, this is not
evidence that production is conducted in an optimal way. A different choice of techniques may
lead to a greater overall output and in the new situation Pareto relevant externalities may exist.”).
For a related discussion of the implications of discontinuities in institutional alternatives, see
KNIGHT, supra note 57, at 117–22.
75. See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 63, at 377. See generally Coase, supra note 71.
76. On the other hand, she might be forced to an even greater divergence from the social
optimal by a limited choice set, if it led her (on facts different from those shown in Figure 2) to
build higher than even she herself would prefer. See supra Part III.C.
77. Similar analysis might be used to evaluate other limited menus, such as the numerus
clausus principle in property law. For a recent discussion of this principle as it relates to the
emergence of new property forms, see Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus
Principle, Property Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2275 (2015).
78. See supra Part II.
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moves in interacting with each other, undercontributing or overdrawing
becomes easier to observe. This can constrain self-serving behavior and
reinforce reciprocity, leading actors to choose socially preferable options even
when it is not strictly in their private self-interest.
Consider how these points interact in common-pool resource contexts,
where there are no formal private property rights. These are the contexts in
which it might be least plausible that parties could bargain their way to full
internalization of externalities, since they lack well-defined property interests
to trade over.79 Restricting the choice menu through relatively chunky
alternatives may, therefore, not mean forgoing any realistic opportunity to
generate a finer-grained solution that would leave all actors better off. The
limited menu may also be more likely to edge actors toward more socially
desirable actions than they would select on their own where those pro-social
choices are reinforced through social norms and reciprocity.80 Thus, in
repeat-play contexts involving common-pool resources, where informal
governance considerations loom large and reciprocity is important, the lack
of fine calibration in choosing how much to give or take may be a feature
rather than a bug.
B. SENSITIVITY TO SEGMENTATION
The discussion in this Essay suggests that scholars and policymakers
should attend more closely to resource segmentation, given its capacity to
bolster the prospects for informal order. As we have seen, the ways in which
draws against, and contributions to, resource systems are demarcated can
have significant effects on behavior—effects that should be studied and
harnessed.
Consider, for example, zoning ordinances like New York’s that state
seating requirements for privately owned public plazas in linear feet, while
giving limited attention to how this seating will be segmented.81 To be sure,
plazas over 10,000 square feet are required to provide moveable seating at a
rate of one chair per 200 square feet.82 The ordinance also encourages
provision of individual seating in plazas of all sizes by granting 24 inches of
credit for individual chairs, even though their actual width averages only 19
79. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55, at 81–82.
80. Instructive in this regard is the way that reporting charitable contributions by categories
or tiers may influence contribution levels. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ZONING RESOLUTION art. III, ch. 7, § 37-741 (2013), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art03c07.pdf.
82. Id. § 37-741(4). The general quantity requirement is one linear foot per 30 square feet
of plaza area. Id. Thus, a plaza of 12,000 square feet would have to provide 400 linear feet of
seating, 120 linear feet of which would take the form of individual chairs (60 chairs, credited at
24 inches each). There are a number of other requirements about types and quantities of seating,
although these restrictions place relatively few limits on how seating is to be divided up. See
generally id. § 37-741.
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inches.83 Although these tweaks tend in the right direction, the baseline idea
of specifying seating by the linear foot seems to embed a misunderstanding
about the way urban space is used. An alternative approach might set
performance standards,84 as by requiring plazas to actually seat a certain
number of people during peak periods like lunchtime. This approach would
require plaza designers to think about what makes spaces inviting to people,
and how to break up space into chunks that people are comfortable
appropriating.
More broadly, efforts to support spontaneous order could be advanced
by making use of behavioral research investigating the impact of resource
configuration on decisions to cooperate or defect. For example, recent
experimental work has examined how a limited field of view for observing the
appropriations of others influences behavior,85 and how costly
communication among appropriators requires trade-offs between
appropriating and communicating.86 Some limited work has considered the
significance of certain resource attributes, such as how clearly bounded and
mobile resources are.87 A focus on resource segmentation could extend these
lines of research by examining how the resource itself—if cut into familiar,
standardized units and harvested or collected in ways visible to all—can serve
as a form of communication.
C. SHIFTING CLIFFS
The externalities generated by lumpy appropriation or contribution
decisions will often be irrelevant to efficiency, as Part III explained. As long as
an individual will make the same choice for her own reasons as she would

83. Id. § 37-741(4); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF SMALL URBAN SPACES 36
(1980). An earlier version of the zoning code gave a larger amount of “credit” (30 inches) for
each individual chair. WHYTE, supra, app. B at 112–13 (providing a digest of the 1975 New York
City zoning amendments).
84. Performance zoning, at least in its pure form, sets standards for factors like noise,
lighting, and traffic, instead of specifying particular uses. See DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE
ZONING: HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988); see also JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD, 153–57 (2004)
(advocating a “performance code”); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 363, 369–96 (1991) (providing an overview of performance zoning). Although
performance standards are more commonly contemplated in the context of controlling negative
externalities, they might be applied to harness positive externalities as well. See Lee Anne Fennell,
Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2532270.
85. See, e.g., Marco A. Janssen, The Role of Information in Governing the Commons: Experimental
Results, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Dec. 2013, at 4; see also supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text
(addressing the significance of visibility to monitoring in a number of contexts).
86. See Marco Janssen et al., The Effect of Constrained Communication and Limited Information in
Governing a Common Resource, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 617 (2014).
87. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 48, at 347 (noting the relative lack of work on resource
attributes and citing existing literature).
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make under conditions of full internalization, it does not matter to efficiency
that others are thereby harmed or benefited. This Subpart focuses on the “for
her own reasons” part of this statement. Attending to it shows how a focus on
resource segmentation fits together with standard responses to externalities.
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are familiar mechanisms for attempting to
align self-interest with the public interest by charging or crediting an
individual for the external impacts of her choices.88 But other legal and policy
moves—from funding supportive infrastructure to leaving offsetting spillovers
untouched—can also make it worthwhile for an individual actor to pursue the
socially preferred course. Actors need not fully internalize all externalities in
order to make socially optimal decisions; undistorted decisionmaking
requires only the internalization of those externalities that are relevant to
efficiency. Stated more intuitively, taxes, subsidies, and similar instruments
need only push the individual actor over the brink of doing the right thing or
pull her back from the cliff of doing the wrong thing (where “right” refers to
the choice that she would make if she were required to fully internalize all
externalities).
Where lumpy choices are involved, very little may be required to give the
actor that necessary push or pull.89 Consider again an example mentioned at
the beginning of the Essay: An individual must decide whether to attend a
festival, where doing so will be beneficial on net but many of the benefits will
flow to others. Suppose that once the actor is at the festival, she will find it
more pleasant to participate and throw off positive externalities than to lurk
sullenly in a corner. The trick, then, is to make it worth her while to attend.
She does not need to capture all the benefits that she will generate in order
for this to be the case; rather, she need only find the proposition of attending
to be a net positive. Minor subsidies in cash or in kind—even if much lower
than the externalized benefits she will produce—can be enough to spur the
lumpy attendance decision. Investments in infrastructure that reduce her
costs of getting to a festival, for example, can push the balance sheet into
positive terrain.90

88. Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are named after A.C. Pigou, who advocated using these
instruments to address gaps between private and social payoffs. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS
OF WELFARE 192–196 (4th ed. 1962); see also Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates,
Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 680–82 (1992) (describing
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies).
89. See Gergen, supra note 66, at 1015 (explaining that where tasks are lumpy in a principal–
agent setting, “the trick for the principal is to get the agent started so that the agent’s self-interest
will take over”); id. at 1015–16 (observing that legal rules can at times help provide this
motivational push).
90. Cf. id. at 1010–11, 1015 (explaining how the structuring of oil and gas leases induce
lessees to begin lumpy investments); Rose, supra note 10, at 770 (discussing how public choices
about roads and waterways encouraged commerce).
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There can also be instances in which refraining from charging back
negative spillovers to an actor will facilitate that same actor’s provision of
positive externalities. For example, Keith Hylton has observed that certain
liability-constraining rules in tort law may help to encourage (or at least not
discourage) acts that, while creating some risk, also produce positive
externalities that the individual is not able to capture.91 Commentators have
similarly noted the positive externalities that were generated by “icemen” who
cleared roads in the Raleigh area following Hurricane Fran in 1996 to better
access customers whom they could price-gouge.92 Their accounts suggest that
the promise of supernormal profits induced these entrepreneurs to
undertake the (incidental) provision of a public good—cleared roadways.93
Again, the lumpiness inherent in these situations diminishes the amount of a
push that is necessary to cause people to perform acts that have positive
spillovers.
Likewise, even small negative pressures may interact with resource
segmentation to control draws against the commons. The pricing structure of
some city bike-sharing programs offers an interesting illustration. Chicago’s
Divvy system, for example, allows a patron who has purchased either an
annual membership or a 24-hour pass to borrow a bike for free—but usage
surcharges will accrue if she keeps the bike out for more than 30 minutes
without returning to a Divvy station to check it out again.94 There is no limit
to how many 30-minute use segments one can rack up seriatim.95 But
returning to a station repeatedly is a minor hassle, and it reinforces the idea
that the bikes are meant to be kept in circulation, not hogged by one person
for an extended period. Like a tiny serving spoon, the setup communicates
something about how much each patron is meant to take.

91. Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501,
1502, 1508–09 (2006).
92. See Michael Munger, They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging Laws Prohibit Scarcity?, LIBR. ECON.
& LIBERTY (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.
html; see also James McClure & Tyler Watts, The Greatest Externality Story (N)ever Told 20–21
(June 19, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462262.
93. See McClure & Watts, supra note 92, at 21. According to an account relayed by Michael
Munger, the profit-making of the ice sellers was short-lived, as they were soon arrested. See
Munger, supra note 92.
94. Pricing, DIVVY BIKES, https://www.divvybikes.com/pricing (last visited Apr. 13, 2015);
see also Rates, BOULDER B-CYCLE, https://boulder.bcycle.com/pass-rates (providing a similar
pricing structure) (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
95. How It Works, DIVVY BIKES, https://www.divvybikes.com/how-it-works (last visited Apr.
13, 2015) (“Take as many trips as you want during your Membership or Pass period.”); see also
Boulder B-Cycle FAQs, BOULDER B-CYCLE, https://boulder.bcycle.com/faqs (last visited Apr. 13,
2015) (“Can I check out a bike immediately after returning a bike? Yes! There is no wait period
required between B-cycle returns and checkouts.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Resource segmentation matters. This Essay has focused on two ways that
segmentation may prove important to the success of spontaneous order. First,
it can influence governance costs. Second, by constructing choice sets, it can
help align private decisions with those that are socially optimal. As a first step
toward fostering more robust and sustainable forms of spontaneous order, law
and policy should take account of the role of resource segmentation as an
important design element, and one that is often amenable to social
construction.
The analysis here holds significance beyond the context of explicit public
goods or common-pool resources. All systems of private property are mixed
systems—spillovers are ubiquitous, and private property derives much of its
value from the aggregate acts of contribution and appropriation taking place
in the neighborhood, district, metropolis, or region. How well those mixed
systems work depends on how well individual actors can coordinate their
innumerable independent actions. The ability to harness and aggregate
dispersed private information is the hallmark and core advantage of any
system of spontaneous order. Resource segmentation represents a broadspectrum technology for eliciting and transmitting information, by
constructing choices and rendering those choices visible.

